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BYNG, Admiral
An appeal to the People
1756.

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AN

APPEAL

TO THE

PEOPLE:

CONTAINING,

The Genuine and Entire LETTER of Admiral *Byng* to the Secr. of the Ad——y:

OBSERVATIONS on thoſe PARTS of it which were omitted by the Writers of the *Gazette:*

AND

What might be the REASONS for ſuch OMISSIONS.

——————Nec lex eſt æquior ulla
Quam necis artifices arte perire ſua.

OVID.

PART the Firſt.

LONDON:

Printed for *J. Morgan,* in *Pater-Noſter-Row.*

1756.

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AN

APPEAL

TO THE

PEOPLE, &c.

IN all States of whatever Plan the Conſtitution may be formed, general Prejudices are extremely apt to take too ſtrong Poſſeſſion of the Hearts of Men, but in none are the People ſo open to the Influence of that Impulſe as in Governments, where, from the Nature of the Eſtabliſhment, they make a Part of the legiſlative Power.

FROM this Cauſe at preſent in this Kingdom, conſtituted on a Plan of Liberty, it is probable, that as well as anciently in *Athens* and *Rome*, popular Condemnation and Applauſe are more particularly viſible in the Actions of all Ranks of Men, than in monarchic or deſpotic States: Hence it is, that thoſe who become the favourite Objects of this People, are for the moſt

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Part preſerved inviolate from the Malevolence of the M——rs, and thoſe who become Objects of their Reſentment or Contempt, are abandoned to the full Force of m——l Attacks. No Man can be ſafely puniſhed, or ſafely permitted to eſcape Puniſhment, when the Nation is in great Ferment, contrary to the general Opinion of his Deſerts, however well inclined the M——rs may be to ſave or deſtroy.

THIS Conſent or Diſapprobation of the Public, frequently proves to be the juſt Counterpoiſe which weighs againſt the miniſterial Inclinations, when unreaſonably intended to reward or puniſh thoſe who become the Objects of the national Conſideration, and a neceſſary Sanction to all their Proceedings of a public Nature; for theſe Reaſons, whenever, by m——l Meaſures long miſconducted, ſome ſiniſter Event becomes the Conſequence of their Adminiſtration; thoſe in the Cabinet who have little Honeſty and leſs Underſtanding to direct a Nation either in Peace or War, to appoint proper Means for attacking their Enemies, and protecting their own Country by Land or Sea; in ſhort, thoſe who are unequal to every Duty of a M——r, are ſtill cunning enough to think it indiſpenſibly neceſſary, to throw the whole Blame and Diſgrace of the ill Succeſs, on the viſible Object who preſided in the Scene of Action, to faſcinate the Underſtandings of the Multitude by deluſive and partial Repreſentations,

tions, and ſculk from their Indignation behind the Reſentment, which their Adherents and Abettors have craftily raiſed againſt the Commander in the Day of Battle.

To quote Inſtances of this Kind, would be to mention almoſt all the paſt Facts in Hiſtory, in which Military Affairs have proved unſucceſsful, from the Iniquity, Negligence, or Incapacity, of the M——rs, and the Chief in Command has been called to public Juſtification: and indeed as the Dependants of M——rs muſt be more numerous than thoſe of a ſuſpected Commander, and as the Love of Money and their own Intereſt is more particularly prevalent, in ſuch Men, than the Love of Honeſty of Truth, and of their Country, it has too generally happened, that by means of m——l Faction, the innocent Commanders have been condemned by the People, and the guilty Adminiſtration not attended to or acquitted. It has been remarked, that the Tribunal of the People has generally pronounced righteous Sentences, when all the Circumſtances of the Affair have been brought before it; and even where the Deciſions have been either defective or unjuſt, that it has been chiefly owing to partial and unfair Repreſentations of the Subject; for theſe Reaſons, it neceſſarily becomes the Intereſt of all Miniſters, who intend to transfer the Guilt of an Action from themſelves to the Commanders in any unfortunate undertaking, to

 conceal

conceal and misrepresent every Circumstance, which can possibly offer any favourable Idea, for the Justification and Defence of those who have unhappily miscarried in their Endeavours, under their wrong Directions and ill-concerted Measures, and to destine them the public Sacrifice and Atonement for their Inability or Iniquity.

To effect this, and their own Preservation, Ten Thousand idle and groundless Reports, which may tend to countenance and support that Part of the Affair only which they think necessary to be offered to the Public, are daily spread by their Emissaries; hence it arises, that from partial Views of the whole Circumstances, from limited Considerations of the Subject, Things appear to be just, which are the rankest Injustice, the Guiltless die, and the Guilty escape from condign Punishment.

This has frequently been the Consequence of Craft in M——rs, and many an innocent Man has suffered from this cruel Cunning of Men in Power; by these Arts the Passions of the People, greatly incensed and knavishly seduced, have been misled to condemn Men as Destroyers of the Crown and Nation's Honour, who are only made to appear in that Light, by the Wickedness and Wiles of those very M——s who ruined the public Welfare, and betrayed the Glory of the Sovereign; it is during this Tumult in the Minds

Minds of Men, too turbulent at firſt to be appeaſed by, or liſten to, the Voice of Reaſon, that M——rs have taken Occaſion to ſacrifice a Commander in Chief, to appeaſe the Wrath of the People and ſave themſelves.

THIS having been already the Event in numberleſs Inſtances, muſt naturally prevail again, and be attempted, whenever an iniquitous, weak, or inattentive M——r entertains the Deſign of ſcreening himſelf from Puniſhment, by the Death of another Man leſs criminal; without this Precaution, the firſt Impetuoſity in the Multitude ſubſiding, and more Truth being let in upon the Subject and their Minds, that which was condemned under a partial View, becomes approved of under a general one, the M——r receives that Fate which he had allotted for the Commander, and Juſtice takes Place where Heaven always deſigned it ſhould, on the nefarious.

IT may perhaps by this Time be ſuſpected, that all this Preface is advanced to prepare a Juſtification of the late Behaviour of Admiral *B—g*, and that I, his Advocate, am endeavouring to ſcreen him from the public Reſentment. Nothing is leſs true; my Intent is only to lay the whole Affair candidly before you, aſſuring you at the ſame Time, that no Man can be more irritated againſt his Conduct than I was in the beginning, 'till what I am going to offer to

your

your Opinions became the prevailing Power over mine.

I AM fully convinced that the People of this Country have the Love of Juſtice ſo ſtrongly implanted in their Boſoms, that nothing can efface or over-rule it by direct and open Force; but I know alſo, that by Concealment of Truth and Miſrepreſentation of Circumſtances, the Minds of Multitudes, as well as of the wiſeſt Individuals, may be warped from Equity, and induced to determine diametrically oppoſite to right Reaſon, however ardently they ſeek the Truth.

INDEED, I freely own my Sentiments are much altered, by being indulged with authentic Evidence of Admiral *B—g*'s Behaviour in the *Mediterranean*; and appealing to you as Judges of his Guilt or Innocence, I dare believe, when what I have to ſay is laid before you, even in granting the moſt unfavourable Opinions you can entertain of him to be juſt, you will allow that he has been moſt unjuſtifiably dealt with by thoſe who ſent him on the Expedition.

BETWEEN perfect Innocence and perfect Guilt there are innumerable Degrees in the Scale of Offence; and as no Man can ſay he is without Fault, ſo none can be pronounced all Guiltineſs; the Nature of Crimes differs as much in Degrees as thoſe who commit them; and the Nature of Juſtice is ſuch, that unleſs it be truly adapted to the

the Degree of Offence, it becomes Injuſtice; and that which is the due Puniſhment for one Crime is converted to Cruelty, when inflicted for the Commiſſion of a leſs; though it be juſt to condemn the Murderer to Death, is it not too ſevere to deprive thoſe of Life, who ſteal Bread to ſatisfy the Calls of Nature in the Moment of periſhing by Hunger?

In Caſes of Diſloyalty, the Officers who are moſt active in recruiting Troops againſt their King, and braveſt in the Day of Battle, are always conſidered as leſs culpable in the Breach of their Allegiance and Duty, than the Creators of the Rebellion, though they never appear in Arms; the moſt obvious Objects of Reſentment are frequently the leaſt guilty of all who are concerned.

In like Manner, when M——rs have heretofore been determined to ſell the Intereſt of their K—g and Country, thoſe whom they employed to execute their Purpoſes, however guilty, have been conſidered as leſs criminal, whilſt their Leaders, like *Satan*, firſt tempted to ſin, continue tempting others to their own and the Nation's Ruin; not that I ſay this to intimate that this Kingdom has been ſold on a late Occaſion, much leſs that Mr *B—g* is conſcious of the Sale. I know he is not; but to ſhow only that in ſuch aggravating Inſtances even, there muſt be Men more notoriouſly guilty than the

the moſt obvious Offender, and that it therefore becomes neceſſary to point out who they are, that the foremoſt in Offence may be firſt in Puniſhment, and not by removing the ſubordinate, preſerve the chief Contrivers, to perpetrate more Miſchief to their Country's Ruin.

To fix the Degree of every Crime in the Scale of Offence, becomes then as much an Act of Juſtice, as to protect the Innocent or condemn the Guilty; and to lay the Caſe of Mr *B—g* fairly before you, muſt appear a laudable Attempt in the Eyes of all humane and juſt Men, becauſe every *Engliſhman* has a Right to a fair Plea and candid Judgment; and without being acquainted with all the Circumſtances, no Deciſion can be made but what muſt be partial and defective. If it ſhall appear then, at the End of this Enquiry, that Miſrepreſentation, Calumny, Concealment of Truth, and Tales of Falſhood, propagated and committed by thoſe who purſue Mr *B—g*, and their Confederates, have induced you to pronounce thoſe ſevere Cenſures which have been paſſed againſt him, when Things come to be placed in their true Light, and the Miſt of Craft removed from your Eyes; when, if it be apparent that your Judgment has been miſled by erroneous and partial Repreſentations, ſhall not then the Love of Juſtice move ye to reverſe thoſe Decrees which ye have already made, and the Love of Truth prompt you to renounce the Errors of your

your former Deciſion, with the ſame Zeal with which you embraced it, you will then think it as much the Duty of an *Engliſh* Subject, and of a Man, to remit your Reſentment againſt Mr *B—g*, as it will be to direct it on the great Promoters of your Ruin and Diſgrace.

WITHOUT manifeſting this Candour, Men obſtinately confeſs, that they prefer following an Error once adopted, to renouncing it for a Truth which may have been long hidden from their Perceptions, by the moſt malignant Artifices of the moſt pernicious Men: This Reflection, I hope, ſhall never be imputed to the Behaviour of *Engliſhmen*.

IN this View and to this Intent I ſtand forth, not as the Friend or Advocate of Mr *B—g*, but as the Friend and Advocate of Juſtice, my King, and Country; to make apparent to all Eyes, how the firſt has been violated, and the latter abuſed and ruined; to explain how it becomes your Duty, though the Crime of Mr *B—g* be ever ſo enormous, to provide that it be fairly examined, and the Ad——l impartially treated; to ſhow you in what Manner thoſe Evidences, which favour the Juſtification of him, have been cruelly with-held from the public Eye, baſely miſrepreſented, and others added to inſinuate their coming from his Hands; and in his Place permit me to ſpeak to the Hearts and Underſtandings of all *Engliſhmen*,

uncorrupted and uninfluenced by m——l Bribes, Places, and Penſions. Let me ſuppoſe that any one indifferent Man amongſt you had been employed in a military Action of Conſequence, and had written to either of the others an Account of his Behaviour, and of the Tranſaction on which not only his Honour but his very Life depended, is there a Man amongſt you who would have concealed or miſrepreſented any Part of this Account, with Deſign to accompliſh the Writer's Undoing? I am convinced you would not have committed ſuch Baſeneſs. What then is the juſt Due of ſuch Men, if ſuch there are, who have dared to commit an Action of that Nature, not improbably, duping their R—l Maſter to this iniquitous Intent, without his Knowledge of the real Circumſtances, and making you, the honeſt Subjects of this Realm, Abettors of all this horrid Injuſtice? What then muſt be the State of that Man's Boſom, who may have ſeen his own Letter ſtripped of every Part which can make moſt effectually in his Favour, imperfectly given to the public Examination, and the People enraged againſt his Conduct by this partial Repreſentation of his own Account, concealing the moſt material Circumſtances which determined him to behave as he did.

WHAT profligate and abandoned Hearts muſt ſuch Men poſſeſs, who, by Omiſſions of whole Paragraphs of a Commander's own Letter,

ter, and Additions of others, can leſſen the Force of his Juſtification in an Affair of Life and Death, change the Account of his Proceedings, and almoſt efface the whole Meaning of the Letter, to make his own Words condemn him to the Multitude, by ſpeaking half what they expreſs, and extorting, by this new Way of putting Letters to the Torture, ſo contradictory to the Spirit of the *Engliſh* Laws, a Meaning ſo different from what they truly import, a Confeſſion of Guilt which is not to be found in the whole uncaſtrated Original. If this appear to be a true Repreſentation, you will not withhold a juſt Reſentment on this Occaſion; and that it is, I dare to make appear from ſuch Proofs, that even the greateſt Enemy againſt Mr *B—g* ſhall be obliged to confeſs his Conviction of the Truth of what ſhall be ſaid; and that, however guilty he may appear to be, in Compariſon with his Oppreſſors, he is as innocent as the Perſon who treads on a Worm compared with *Cain* who ſlew his Brother, or he who burns his own Hovel, to him that ſet Fire to the ſhattered Ruins of *Liſbon* amidſt the Calamities of the Earthquake.

In Truth, and before the Eyes of Heaven, if what I ſhall offer to your Conſideration appears to be Fact, How are ſuch barbarous Proceedings reconcilable with Humanity, or eſſentially different from a Forgery? to add what can undo a Man, or eraſe what can preſerve him,

how do they vary in the Nature and Conſequence of the Deſign? And to aggravate the Heinouſneſs of the Offence, it is not like the deſpicable Intent of defrauding a Man of his Money, but like that of depriving him of his Life; it cannot be an Attempt to rob, though it may be to murder.

Is it not a Crime equal to that of Forgery, when men, by leaving out the moſt material Circumſtances of a Man's Defence, leſſen the Force, or change the Import of the whole, rendering him to the People the deteſted Object of their Indignation and Deſire of Puniſhment? Is it not by ſuch cruel Means that he may become unjuſtly condemned? Added to this, if it ſhall appear that this Iniquity is purpoſely committed to ſcreen themſelves from their juſt Rewards, what is it but an execrable Endeavour to take away the Life of a leſs guilty, perhaps innocent, Man, to ſave their own deſtructive Heads from condign Puniſhment.

Any Attempt of this Nature appears the moſt inhuman of all Kinds of corrupted Evidence I have hitherto known, omitting the Parts which juſtify, and retaining thoſe which ſeem to condemn. Is it not a Subornation of Witneſs? Is it not obliging the very perſon to give Teſtimony contrary to the Truth of the Fact, and repugnant to his own Preſervation?

If this ſhould appear to be the Caſe with Reſpect to the Man whoſe Conduct I am going to lay before you; if M——rs ſhall be found to have dealt with him in this inhuman Manner, I doubt not but the Tide of Reſentment, which has ſo long and ſo violently ran againſt him, will be turned in His Favour, and ſet as ſtrongly againſt thoſe that may be diſcovered to have thus cruelly meditated his Ruin to preſerve themſelves.

This Attempt of faithfully placing before your Eyes the real State of an injured Fellow-Subject, will I hope be forgiven; injured he muſt appear to be, however Guilty, becauſe no Man's Guilt can juſtify the concealing or altering the Nature of his Evidence, or repreſenting him to his Countrymen more criminal than he is, with Deſign to ſee him over-borne by the Torrent of Popular Prejudice.

In my Endeavours to do this, I ſhall only lay before you the genuine Letter which was ſent to the S——y of the A——y by Admiral *B—g*, dated on board the *Ramillies* off *Minorca*, *May* the 25th, 1756, in it's intire State, unmangled by the Writers of the *Gazette*; endeavour to inveſtigate the true Motives which induced the publiſhing of it in this imperfect State, on *June* the 26th, and impartially explain

plain the Miſchief it was probably deſigned to do Mr *B—g*.

THIS I preſume is juſtifiable in the Eyes of Heaven and Earth, to devellope and characteriſe the Deſigns of Men in ſuch Proceedings againſt the A——l, and to examine if Self-Preſervation, attempted by Cruelty and Injuſtice, might not have been the chief Motives to this inhuman Conduct.

ALL I requeſt, is a calm and diſpaſſionate Examination of the whole Affair, and what there is to be ſaid upon it; and then, though Prejudices of all Kinds are difficultly eraſed, more eſpecially thoſe which are received againſt the imagined Enemies of their Country. I entertain not the leaſt Suſpicion, but to prove the Perſon againſt whom this Tempeſt of Injuries has been let looſe, who has been drawn, hanged, and burnt in every Part of the Town, is the leaſt Guilty of all concerned in the Conduct of the Affair in the *Mediterranean*, the leaſt meriting ſuch opprobrious Treatment, and the moſt worthy your Protection; and that all thoſe injurious Proceedings will be found to have taken Birth from conſcious Guilt, the Fear of your Reſentment, and public Juſtice, and to with-hold your Eyes from diſcerning the juſt Objects of your Indignation: By this, I mean not to ſoothe your Hearts to diſproportioned Mercy; all I deſire is, that you may be alike

alike juſt in your Deciſions to every Man proved a Delinquent; let not the great, when proved Offenders, ſcreen themſelves by the Sacrifice of the leſs criminal; diſtinguiſh their Offences and the Degrees of them, deliver your Opinions freely of the Puniſhment which is due to each, for without your Approbation, they will not preſume to condemn him unmeriting it; and if you are ſtill deluded to believe amiſs by partial and unjuſt Repreſentations, will they not ſcreen themſelves and complete his Deſtruction however Innocent?

ALL I mean by what has been already urged, is to appeal to your Tribunal, in Juſtice to you who have been ſo flagrantly abuſed by deceitful Repreſentations, and made Accomplices in Abetting the wicked Purpoſes of bad Men, in Juſtice to my own Convictions, and the Senſations of a humane Heart, which has been deeply touched with Reſentment of this Barbarity towards Mr *Byng*; in Juſtice to, and Compaſſion for one, who by injurious and unmerited Ill-Uſage from their Hands, has been rendered ſo obnoxious to the Public, that ſcarce a Man dares openly appear to be his Friend.

PERMIT me now, to lay the true Copy of the Letter as it left the Hands of Admiral *Byng*, before you, uncurtailed or altered.

A Ge-

A Genuine Copy of Admiral *Byng*'s Letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

The Parts printed in *Italics* and Comma's, mark the Parts omitted in the GAZETTE.

Ramillies, off Minorca,
25 May, 1756.

SIR,

I HAVE the Pleaſure to deſire you will acquaint their Lordſhips, that having ſailed from Gibraltar the 8th, I got off Mahon the 19th, having been joined by His Majeſty's Ship Phœnix, off Majorca, two Days before, „ *by* „ *whom I had confirmed the Intelligence I re-* „ *ceived at Gibraltar, of the Strength of the* „ *French Fleet, and of their being off Mahon.* „ *His Majeſty's Colours were ſtill flying at the* „ *Caſtle of St Philip's, and I could perceive* „ *ſeveral Bomb Batteries playing upon it from* „ *different Parts; French Colours we ſaw fly-* „ *ing on the Weſt Part of St Philip's. I diſ-* „ *patched the Phœnix, Cheſterfield, and Dolphin* „ *a Head, to reconnoitre the Harbour's Mouth,* „ *and Captain Hervey, to endeavour to land a* „ *Letter for General Blakeny, to let him know* „ *the Fleet was here to his Aſſiſtance, though* „ *every one was of Opinion, we could be of no* „ *uſe to him, as by all Accounts, no Place was*

„ *ſecured*

„ *ſecured for covering a Landing, could we have*
„ *ſpared any People. The Phœnix was alſo to*
„ *make the private Signal between Captain*
„ *Harvey and Captain Scrope, as this latter*
„ *would undoubtedly come off, if it were prac-*
„ *table, having kept the Dolphin's Barge with*
„ *him; but the Enemy's Fleet appearing to the*
„ *South-Eaſt, and the Wind at the ſame Time*
„ *coming ſtrong off the Land, obliged me to call*
„ *thoſe Ships in, before they could get quite ſo*
„ *near the Entrance of the Harbour, as to make*
„ *ſure what Batteries or Guns might be placed*
„ *to prevent our having any Communication with*
„ *the Caſtle.*" Falling little Wind, it was Five before I could form my Line, or diſtinguiſh any of the Enemy's Motions, and not at all to judge of their Force more than by their Numbers, which were Seventeen, and Thirteen appeared large. They at firſt ſtood towards us in a regular Line, and tacked about Seven, which I judged was to endeavour to gain the Wind of us in the Night; ſo that being late, I tacked, in order to keep the Weather-Gage of them, as well as to make ſure of the Land Wind, in the Morning, being very hazy and not above five Leagues off Cape Mola. We tacked off towards the Enemy at Eleven; and at Day-light had no ſight of them. But two Tartans with the French private Signal being cloſe in with the Rear of our Fleet, I ſent the Princeſs Louiſa to chaſe one, and made the Signal for the Rear-Admiral, who was neareſt the other, to ſend

Ships to chace her; the Princeſs Louiſa, Defiance, and Captain, became at a great Diſtance, but the Defiance took her's, which had two Captains, two Lieutenants, and One Hundred and Two private Soldiers, who were ſent out the Day before with Six Hundred Men on board Tartans to reinforce the French Fleet, on our then appearing off the Place. The Phœnix, on Captain Hervey's offer, prepared to ſerve as a Fire-Ship, but without damaging her as a Frigate, 'till the Signal was made to prime, when ſhe was then to ſcuttle her Decks, every thing elſe being prepared, as the Time and Place allowed of. The Enemy now began to appear from the Maſt-head; I called in the Cruiſers, and when they had joined me, I tacked towards the Enemy, and formed the Line a-head. I found the French were preparing theirs to Leeward, having unſucceſsfully endeavoured to weather me: They were Twelve large Ships of the Line, and five Frigates. As ſoon as I judged the Rear of our Fleet to be the Length of their Van, we tacked all together, and immediately made the Signal for the Ships that led, to lead large, and for the Deptford to quit the Line, that ours might become equal in Number with theirs. At Two I made the Signal to engage, as I found it was the ſureſt Method of ordering every Ship to cloſe down on the one that fell to their Lot. And here I muſt expreſs my great Satisfaction at the very gallant Manner in which the Rear-Admiral ſet the Van the Example, by

inſtantly

inſtantly bearing down on the Ships he was to engage with his ſecond, and who occaſioned one of the French Ships to begin the Engagement, which they did, by raking ours as they went down; I bore down on the Ship that lay oppoſite me, and began to engage him, after having received the Fire for ſome Time in going down. The Intrepid, „ *unfortunately*" (in the very beginning had his Fore-top-maſt ſhot away, and as that hung on his Fore-ſail and backed it, he had no Command of his Ship, his Fore-tack and all his Braces being cut at the ſame Time, ſo that he drove on the next Ship to him, and obliged that, and the Ships a-head of me to throw all aback; this obliged me to do ſo alſo for ſome Minutes to avoid their falling on board me, though not before we had drove our Adverſary out of the Line, who put before the Wind, and had ſeveral Shot fired at him from his own Admiral. This not only cauſed the Enemy's Center to be unattacked, but left the Rear-Admiral's Diviſion rather uncovered for ſome little Time. I ſent and called to the Ships a-head of me to make Sail on, and go down on the Enemy, and ordered the Cheſterfield to lay by the Intrepid, and the Deptford to ſupply the Intrepid's Place. I found the Enemy edged away conſtantly, and as they went three Feet to our one, they would never permit our cloſing with them, but took the Advantage of deſtroying our Rigging; for though I cloſed the Rear-Admiral faſt, I found I could

not again close the Enemy, whose Van were fairly drove from their Line; but their Admiral was joining them by bearing away. By this Time 'twas past Six, and the Enemies Van and ours were at too great a Distance to engage; I perceived some of their Ships stretching to the Northward, and I imagined they were going to form a new Line; I made the Signal for the headmost Ships to tack, and those that led before with Larboard Tacks, to lead with the Starboard, that I might by the first, keep (if possible) the Wind of the Enemy, and by the second, be between the Rear-Admiral's Division and the Enemy, as his had suffered most, as also to cover the Intrepid, which I perceived to be in a very bad Condition, and whose loss would very greatly give the Ballance against us, if they had attacked us the next Morning as I expected. I brought to about Eight that Night to join the Intrepid, and to refit our Ships as fast as possible, and continued so all Night. The next Morning we saw nothing of the Enemy, though we were still lying to; Mahon was N. N. W. about ten or eleven Leagues. I sent Cruisers out to look for the Intrepid and Chesterfield, who joined me the next Day; and having, from a State and Condition of the Squadron brought me in, found that the Captain, Intrepid, and Defiance, (which latter has lost her Captain) were much damaged in their Masts, „ *so that they were endangered of not* „ *being able to secure their Masts properly at* „ *Sea*;

„ *Sea*; *and alſo, that the Squadron in general* „ *were very ſickly, many killed and wounded,* „ *and no where to put a Third of their Num-* „ *ber, if I made an Hoſpital even of the Forty* „ *Gun Ship, which was not eaſy at Sea.*" I thought it proper in this Situation, to call a Council of War before I went again to look for the Enemy. I deſired the Attendance of General Stuart, Lord Effingham, and Lord Robert Bertie, and Colonel Cornwallis, that I might collect their Opinions upon the preſent Situation „ *of Minorca and Gibraltar, and make* „ *ſure of protecting the latter, ſince it was found* „ *impracticable to either ſuccour or relieve the* „ *former with the Force we had*; *for though we* „ *may juſtly claim the Victory, yet we are much* „ *inferior to the Weight of their Ships, though* „ *the Numbers are equal, and they have the* „ *Advantage of ſending to Minorca their* „ *wounded, and getting Reinforcements of Sea-* „ *men from their Tranſports, and Soldiers from* „ *their Camp*; *all which, undoubtedly has been* „ *done in this Time that we have been laying* „ *to to refit, and often in Sight of Minorca*; „ *and their Ships have more than once appeared* „ *in a Line from our Maſt-heads. I ſend their* „ *Lordſhips the Reſolution of the Council of* „ *War,*" in which there was not the leaſt Contention or Doubt aroſe. „ *I hope indeed we* „ *ſhall find Stores to refit us at Gibraltar, and* „ *if I have any Reinforcement, will not loſe a* „ *Moment's Time to ſeek the Enemy again, and*

„ *once*

„ *more give them Battle, though they have a* „ *great Advantage in being clean Ships, that* „ *go three Feet to our one, and therefore* „ *have the Choice how they will engage us,* „ *or if they will at all, and will never let* „ *us close them, as their sole View is the dis-* „ *abling our Ships, in which they have but* „ *too well succeeded, though we obliged them to* „ *bear up.*" I do not send their Lordships the Particulars of our Losses and Damages by this, as it would take me much Time, and that I am willing none should be lost in letting them know an Event of such Consequence. „ *I cannot help* „ *urging their Lordships for a Reinforcement,* „ *if none are yet sailed, on their Knowledge of* „ *the Enemy's Strength in these Seas, and which,* „ *by very good Intelligence, will in a few Days* „ *be strengthened by four more large Ships from* „ *Toulon, almost ready to sail, if not now sailed* „ *to join these.*" I dispatch this to Sir Benjamin Keene by way of Barcelona, and am making the best of my way to „ *cover*„ Gibraltar; from which Place I propose sending their Lordships a more particular Account.

I am,

SIR,

Your most humble Servant,

Hon. John Cleveland, Esq; J. B.

P. S. I must

P. S. I muſt deſire you will acquaint their Lordſhips, that I have appointed Captain Hervey to the Command of the Defiance, in the room of Captain Andrews ſlain in the Action.

I have juſt ſent the Defects of the Ships, as I have got it made out, whilſt I was cloſing my Letter."

BEFORE I proceed to examine what may have been the probable Reaſons for omitting the above Paragraphs printed in *Italics* and Comma's, permit me to lay before you, authentic Liſts of the Fleets which engaged in the *Mediterranean* under the Commands of Admiral *Byng* and Monſieur *La Galliſſonniere*, as they were in Number of Ships, Number of Men, Number of Cannon, and Weight of Metal; and from a fair Compariſon in theſe Particulars, ſhow you on which Side, and to what Degree the Advantage lay.

THE

THE Honourable Admiral *Byng*'s Squadron, when he engaged Monſieur *De La Galliſſonniere*'s off Cape *Mola*, 20 *May*, 1756.

Ships Names.	Guns	Weight of Metal on the Lower Deck.	Middle Deck.	Upper Deck.	Men.
		lb.	lb.	lb.	
Ramillies - -	90	32	18	12	780
Culloden - -	74	32		18	600
Buckingham -	68	32		18	535
Lancaſter - -	66	32		18	520
Trident - -	64	24		12	500
Intrepid - -	64	32		18	480
Captain - -	64	24		12	480
Revenge - -	64	24		12	480
Kingſton - -	60	24		9	400
Defiance - -	60	24		12	400
Princeſs Louiſa -	56	24		12	400
Portland - -	48	24		12	300
	778				5875
Frigates.					
Deptford - -	48				280
Cheſterfield -	40				250
Phœnix - -	22				160
Dolphin - -	22				160
Experiment -	22				160
Total - - -	932				6885

MONSIEUR

MONSIEUR *De La Galliſſonniere*'s Squadron, when he landed the Troops at *Minorca* 18 *April*, and at the Engagement with Admiral *Byng*'s Squadron off Cape *Mola*, 20 *May*, 1756.

Ships Names.	Guns	Weight of Metal on the		Number of		Total Men on board each Ship.
		Lower Deck.	Upper Deck.	Seamen.	Soldiers.	
		lb.	lb.			
Foudroyant -	84	52	24	700	250	950
La Couronne -	74	42	24	650	150	800
Le Guerrier -	74	42	24	650	150	800
Le Temeraire	74	42	24	650	150	800
Le Redoutable	74	42	24	650	150	800
L'Hipopothame	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Fier - -	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Triton -	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Lion - -	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Contant -	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Sage - -	64	36	24	500	100	600
L'Orphée - -	64	36	24	500	100	600
	828			6800	1550	8350
Frigates.						
La Juno - -	46			300		300
La Roze - -	30			250		250
La Gracieuſe -	30			250		250
La Topaze -	24			250		250
La Nymphe -	24			200		200
Total - -	982			8050	1550	9600

In the first Place, the Number of Ships was equal on each Side; from this then no Advantage was to be drawn by one Party above another. As the Frigates on either Side did not engage, notwithstanding the *French* exceeded the *Englifh* greatly in Number of Men and Weight of Metal, I fhall not attempt to derive from that Circumftance any Argument of the Superiority of the *French* Fleet to that of the *Englifh*, but confider thofe Ships which were drawn up in Line of Battle, only remarking the Weaknefs of that Objection to the Conduct of the Admiral, in leaving the *Deptford* out of the Line; when the fame Thing was done by Monfieur *La Gallifonniere* in not taking the *Junon* into his Line; the firft being of Forty-eight Guns, and the latter of Forty-fix.

The Number of Ships being equal, the next Confideration is the Number of Guns; and in this Article, according to this Lift, which was received from a Perfon the beft enabled to give a juft Account, and the leaft to be fufpected of doing the contrary, the *French* Fleet exceeded the *Englifh* by Fifty Cannon, the Number of the firft being Eight Hundred Twenty-eight, and of the fecond Seven Hundred Seventy-eight, which gives a Majority of Fifty on the Side of the *French*; but as it may be objected, that, according to other Lifts printed by Authority, the *Hipopothame* and *Fier* are given as Fifty Gun Ships

Ships only, we will ſuppoſe that to be the right, and then the Number of *French* Cannon exceeds the *Engliſh* by Twenty-two Guns only.

THE next Article which comes under Conſideration is the Weight of Metal; and in this Place it ſeems neceſſary to remark, that it is the uſual Cuſtom to denominate the Weight of Metal by the Guns which are on the whole Decks only; hence it happens, tho' three Sizes are only mentioned in the Liſt of the *Ramillies*, and two in that of the *Foudroyant*, that there were ten of the Number on board the *Ramillies* on the Quarter Deck and Forecaſtle, which carried ſix Pounds only, and on board the *Foudroyant* Twenty-four, which placed in the ſame Parts mentioned in the *Ramillies*, carrried only Shot of Twelve Pounds.

THE *Foudroyant* and *Ramillies* then may be thus conſidered with Reſpect to the Cannon which each carried.

Foudroyant.		Ramillies	
Guns.	Weight of Shot.	Guns.	Weight of Shot.
30	of 52 Pounds.	26	of 32 Pounds.
30	24	26	18
24	12	28	12
—	—	10	6
84	2268 lb. each Charge.	—	—
—	—	90	1696 lb. each Charge.
		—	—

DEDUCTING then the leſſer from the greater Number, the Weight of the Shot fired by the *Foudroyant* in a Diſcharge of all the Cannon, exceeds that of the *Ramillies* by Five Hundred Seventy-two Pounds, almoſt a third of the whole Quantity. The Number of Men on board the *Engliſh* Ship, was Seven Hundred and Thirty: on board the *French*, Nine Hundred and Fifty: which gives a Majority of Two Hundred and Twenty Men to the *French* Ship. Now, on a Medium, we may allow Eight Men to a Gun on board the *Foudroyant*, as her Metal is heavier, and Six to a Gun on board the *Ramillies*; this will make Six Hundred Seventy-two at the great Guns, and Two Hundred and Seventy-eight at the ſmall Arms, on board the *French* Ship; and Five Hundred and Forty at the great Guns, and One Hundred and Ninety at the ſmall Arms, on board the *Ramillies*, which gives a Majority of Eighty-eight ſmall Arms Men to the *Foudroyant*, almoſt a third ſuperior to the *Ramillies*. In this Account we have computed, the Officers and others employed in various Duties, amongſt the ſmall Arms; and as each Ship has probably an equal Number engaged in theſe Services, whatever is allowed, being allowed alike on board each Ship, it leaves the ſame Proportion amongſt the ſmall Arms Men; this then effects nothing on the Validity of the Reaſoning.

LET

Let me then imagine them all engaged on board each Ship, the Foudroyant diſcharging from the ſmall Arms, two hundred and ſeventy-eight Balls, and the *Ramillies* one hundred and ninety, the *French* Ship's Fire in this Reſpect exceeds the *Engliſh* by eighty-eight Ball in each generally Volley; let me ſuppoſe alſo, that a Number of Cannon equal to the whole Sum in each Ship, be diſcharged in a Minute, which ſeems no improbable Suppoſition, ſince Cannon are fired twelve Times in a Minute in Land-Service; the Exceſs of Weight of Metal in the *Foudroyant*, compared with that fired by the *Ramillies* in one Hour, will be thirty-four thouſand three hundred and twenty Pounds, a moſt amazing Superiority. If we allow at the ſame Time, four Diſcharges of the Small-Arms in each Minute, then the Number of ſmall Shot fired from the *Foudroyant*, more than from the *Ramillies* in one Hour, will be twenty-one Thouſand one Hundred and Twenty, which increaſes the Chance of the Men being killed on the upper Decks on board the *Engliſh* Ship equal to that Number. The Advantage drawn from the ſmall Arms, is then exactly in Proportion to the Number in which one Ship exceeds another, and the Advantage of the heavier Shot diſcharged from the Cannon, is as the Diameter of each exceeds the other; let me ſuppoſe a thirty-two Pound Ball to be ten Inches in Diameter, ſuch a Shot can paſs between two Objects

eleven

eleven Inches diſtant from each other, and touch neither of them; whereas, allowing a Ball of fifty-two Pounds, to be twelve Inches diameter, and to paſs in the ſame Direction with the former, this laſt Ball *may* deſtroy, but *muſt* inevitably wound both Objects: Again, if you ſuppoſe a Ball of ten Inches diameter, to paſs within half an Inch of any ſingle Object, that of twelve paſſing in the ſame Line by the increaſed Diameter, muſt deſtroy or injure it: In like Manner as the Diameter in Shot increaſes, the Holes which are made in the Sides will be increaſed alſo; thus two Men may be killed by the biggeſt Ball, and not touched by the leſſer; two Ropes cut by the biggeſt, and not touched by the leſſer; and Maſts and Yards carried away by the increaſed Diameter of the heavy Ball, which will be untouched or leſs affected by the lighter; beſides this, Holes between Wind and Water, which are made by heavy Balls, being proportioned to the Diameter alſo, the Danger of ſinking is increaſed, as the Water which flows through the great Aperture, is more than that through the leſſer; every Broadſide then fired from the *Foudroyant*, carries a Probability of doing more Miſchief than that from the *Ramillies*, as the Diameters of all the Balls taken together, fired from the *French* Ship, exceeds that of the *Engliſh*; and for this Reaſon it is in a great Meaſure, that the Maſts, Yards, and Rigging, are more damaged on board *Engliſh* Ships in Battle than on board *French*.

HENCE

HENCE in every View, except Number of Cannon, which are only ſix ſmall Guns of ſix Pounds, the *Foudroyant* is ſuperior to the *Ramillies*, almoſt as three to two; in this Manner of computing the Superiority, which appears to me to be juſt, if for three to two in Force, we put three to two in Ships, which amounts to the ſame Thing, on which Side ought a prudent Man to expect the Victory.

I DO not by this Manner of computing each Force, propoſe to reduce the different Degrees in Strength of each Ship to a Mathematical and demonſtrative Exactneſs, but only to ſhow nearly, how much the Superiority of the *French* Ship was greater than that of the *Engliſh*; as to the Size of the Ships, the *Foudroyant* is the largeſt.

IT may be objected, probably, that the Charge and Diſcharge of a Cannon, inſtead of taking up one Minute, may take up five or perhaps ten, and each Man at the ſmall Arms employ a like Time to charge and fire his Fuſee; even then this will create no Difference, the ſame Time being allowed alike to each Ship, the Superiority of Powers on board the *Foudroyant* to thoſe on board the *Ramillies* will be ſtill preſerved the ſame; and the ſole Alteration ariſing from this is, that by leſs firings, the Superiority

periority is not ſo often exerted, and the Proportion of four to three ſtill remain.

In this Manner of comparing the different Strengths of the two Fleets, I have pitched upon the two Ships which were the neareſt a Match for each other, and here the odds were as four to three. Between the *Couronne* and *Culloden*, it is ſtill greater, and when you deſcend lower, and compare the ſeventy-four and ſixty-four Gun *French* Ships, againſt the ſixty-eight, ſixty-ſix, ſixty-four, and ſixty Gun Ships of *England*, it is three to two; ſo that the Proportion of four to three, is a very inferior Allowance for the Superiority of the *French* Fleet over the *Engliſh* as they met in the *Mediterranean*.

Hence it evidently appears, that if this third Part of Superiority was taken from the twelve *French* Ships, leaving each an equal to the *Engliſh*, there would remain a ſufficient Force to equip four Ships more, then the Number would be ſixteen *French* Ships to twelve *Engliſh*, a Superiority not to be attacked by a prudent Man, ſcarce at any Time, and in this particularly wrong, as we ſhall ſhow in the following Pages.

The inexpreſſible Ignorance of thoſe who appointed and prepared this Fleet for this Expedition, if the ſuccouring *Minorca* was the Deſign of it, muſt appear abſurd beyond all Expreſſion,

Expreſſion, not to give it a worſe Appellation.

HAVING in this Manner endeavoured to aſcertain the Superiority of the *French* to the *Engliſh* Squadron, let me now aſſign the Reaſons for the *French* Cannon being ſo much heavier than the *Engliſh*. Firſt, the Pounds of *France* being heavier than thoſe of *England*, a Shot which they call a thirty-ſix Pounder, is almoſt equal to a forty-two Pound Shot *Engliſh*; and in the above Liſts, the Weights are reduced to the *Engliſh* Standard; another Reaſon was, that to increaſe the Force on board each Ship at *Toulon*, Cannon were put much heavier than uſual on board Ships of ſuch Rates, to make them as much ſuperior as poſſible to the *Engliſh* in the Day of Battle, apprehending no Danger from this increaſed Weight, as the Navigation was ſhort, in Summer Seas, and ſmooth Water. And that it may not appear extraordinary, that Ships ſhould carry Cannon of twenty-four Pounds on the Upper-Deck; the *Invincible* in our Service, taken from the *French*, carries ſuch Guns at preſent.

THE Liſts of each Fleet were placed in the Beginning, to give a juſt Idea of the Strength of them, and to place the whole in a clearer View, which may be ſaid in the following Sheets, where we ſhall mention that given to the Public in the *Gazette*, with

Mr *Byng*'s Letter, to ſhow how fallaciouſly it was inſerted to inſinuate it's coming from his Hands.

HAVING tranſcribed the Letter, given the Liſts of the Fleet and their different Force, let me now enquire what may be the Nature of the Paragraphs omitted in the *Gazette*, and from thence attempt, if it is not poſſible to deduce the true Reaſons for the Omiſſions of them.

THE firſt Article omitted, refers to a Letter ſent from *Gibraltar* by the Admiral, on his Arrival at that Place in his Voyage to *Minorca*, and addreſſed to the Secretary of the Admiralty. This Letter contains an Account of the Number of the *French* Fleet which eſcorted the Embarkation from *Toulon*; the landing of fifteen thouſand Men at *Minorca*, from about a hundred and ſixty or two hundred Traſnports, a concern for the Admiral's not being ſent time enough to prevent this Deſcent, which he imagines he could have effected, had he been ſent ſooner; Reaſons for the Difficulty of relieving the Place unleſs a ſufficient Number of Soldiers could be ſent to diſlodge the *French*, conſidering the immenſe Quantity of Stores, Ammunition, and Proviſions of all Kinds which they brought with them, adding, immediately " I am determin-" ed to ſail up to *Minorca* with the Squadron, " where I ſhall be a better Judge of the Situa-" tion

" tion of Affairs there, and will give General " *Blakeney* all the Aſſiſtance he ſhall require." He then expreſſes *his* Opinion, that of the Chief Engineers at *Gibraltar*, who had ſerved at *St Philips*, and of the other Officers of the Artillery, who were acquainted with the Situation of the Harbour, of what might be the Succeſs of his going to it's Relief, and his and their Reaſons for thoſe Opinions. He then mentions an encloſed Liſt of the Strength of the *French* Ships at *Toulon*, and a Copy of a Letter of Intelligence to General *Blakeney*, giving an Account of the Equipment on that Occaſion; and thence infers an Apprehenſion of the *French* attacking *Gibraltar*, adding, that if *Mahon* could not be relieved, that he ſhould look upon ſecuring *Gibraltar* as his next Object.

He then goes on to expreſs his great Concern, in finding at *Gibraltar*, few or no Stores in the Magazines to ſupply the Squadron; and that the careening Wharf, Sore-houſes, Pits, &c. were entirely decayed; with the great difficulty of getting them repaired, as no Artificers were at that Place, and no Carpenters could be ſpared from the Fleet which was proceeding to *Minorca*; he then mentions his having appointed a proper Perſon to tranſact every Thing towards preparing what was neceſſary, with all poſſible Speed, adding ſomething relating to the Council of War held by General *Fowke*, and the Reſult of it.

THIS Letter was never given to the Public, for Reaſons too evident to be named; yet this is the Letter from which thoſe wiſe Heads inferred that the Admiral would not Fight; which in the Opinion of every honeſt Man, will convey Ideas very different from founding the Preſumption of branding him with Cowardice; and which, though without Deſign, affords very juſt Reaſons to blame the Conduct of the great Head of the A——y.

THIS Letter, if the Publick have any deſire to ſee, accompanied with ſome others, may probably be laid before them.

IS not then the omitting the firſt Article of the Letter in the *Gazette*, deſigned to prevent all Knowledge or Enquiry about the different Force of the two Fleets, to keep your belief of Superiority on the *Engliſh* ſide, and delude you to conclude from the Equality of the Number, that Mr *Byng* was extremely delinquent in not vanquiſhing the *French* Squadron.

THE next Article ſeems omitted with intent to ſuggeſt, that the Admiral's Squadron was never in Sight of *Port-Mahon*, and that he avoided meeting the *French* Fleet, or proceeding directly to Mr *Blakeney*'s Aſſiſtance; whereas by the Objects which he ſaw, and indeed it will be proved by undeniable Evidence, that after

after getting round the ſmall Iſland, called the *Laire* of *Mahon*, at Ten in the Morning he was within a League of the Port; but on ſeeing the Enemy's Fleet, he thought it more immediately his Duty to bear away at Eleven, to meet them. This obliged him to recall, with Reaſon, the three Frigates which he had ſent a-head of the Fleet to reconnoitre the Harbour's Mouth, to land a Letter for the Commander of the Garriſon, to acquaint him the Fleet was arrived to his Aſſiſtance, and to know in what Manner it could be of the moſt effectual Service.

THIS Behaviour will now I imagine, appear to be ſuggeſted by the utmoſt Prudence, all that could have been attempted in the Space of an Hour, and the moſt advantageous Step which could have been taken on that Occaſion: It proves that the Admiral depended not on the hear-ſay Evidence which he had received, even from the beſt Authorities at *Gibraltar*, nor on the united Opinion of every Officer at that Place: But that he was determined to be certified of the true State of the Harbour and Citadel from General *Blakeney* himſelf, as he knew that Captain *Scrope*, who, together with all the Soldiers and Marines of Mr *Edgecomb*'s Ships, and one hundred Seamen, had been left to reinforce the Garriſon, would come off in his Barge, and bring him a juſt Relation of every Circumſtance neceſſary to be known; and though he adds the

Opinions

Opinion of all the Sea and Land Officers, that 'they could render no Service to the Garriſon, 'as no Place was covered for the landing of any 'Men, *could they have ſpared any.*' In this he only gave his Opinion, agreeable to that of all the other Officers. This Opinion had no Influence on his Conduct, and was only meant to ſignify what might have been the Event, ſuppoſing the *French* Fleet had not appeared at that Time.

So far then neither Knowledge of his Profeſſion, Prudence in conducting the Expedition, or Duty to his King and Country, appear to be deficient in him.

His Letter to Mr *Blakeney*, ſent by Mr *Hervey*, though never delivered, for Reaſons immediately to follow, will evince this Truth, and the Public may be ſatisfied by ſeeing it alſo if they pleaſe.

The firſt Care of the Admiral, after coming in Sight of the Port, was to know the true State of the Harbour and Garriſon, to encourage the General and the Soldiers, by acquainting him that he was arrived to his Succour, and deſiring to know how it might moſt effectually be put in Execution.

Are not now the Reaſons which induced the publiſhing this Letter, mangled in that Manner, ſufficiently convincing? Was it not from

from a Perſwaſion, that thoſe Paſſages would convey to your Underſtandings the moſt undeniable Proofs of Knowledge, Prudence, Conduct, and Duty, in the Commander of the Fleet, the Man whom they ſeem too determined to deſtroy? Did not they know that thoſe Words would create a Suſpicion, that an Admiral, ſo provident in every other Reſpect, could not be guilty of what they chuſe to lay to his Charge? And the laſt Words, *Could we have ſpared any People*; Do not theſe plainly pronounce Negligence, Ignorance, Inability, or ſomething worſe, in Men whoſe Duty it is to preſide and direct in the equipping a Fleet? Does it not naturally create this Queſtion, Why a Fleet, ſent with Intent to relieve *St Philip*'s, and aſſiſt the Garriſon againſt a Siege from a very powerful Enemy, was unſupplied with Troops for that Purpoſe? This would probably have condemned the Equippers of the Fleet, and exculpated the Admiral. This was a too dangerous Hint to be truſted with the Public; they felt in their own Hearts that this Neglect or Deſign could not be imputed to him as a Crime; he neither fitted out the Fleet or planned the Expedition; they alſo knew that it muſt fall on them in your Opinion, and therefore it was neceſſary to be concealed from your View.

Let theſe Men, whoſe Duty it was to prepare this Fleet, and plan the Expedition, anſwer

ſwer me, when I aſk them in the Name of you, the People of *England*, who have a juſt Right to know, by what Means and from what Manner of Reaſoning it came to paſs, that a Fleet ſo unequal to the Enemy's as this has been proved to have been, and without Troops, was ſent to relieve *St Philip*'s? Nay, even ſuppoſing a Falſhood, that the Force of the Two Fleets had been equal, and even that the *Engliſh* had carried Troops with that Intent, Why was the Succeſs, of ſuch Conſequence to the Nation, left to the precarious Event of an Equality in Strength, which might have been eaſily prevented by ſending more Ships, uſeleſſly riding at Spithead? No Man, however prejudiced, will preſume to utter, that either of theſe Neglects or Overſights, to ſay no worſe, are to be imputed as Crimes to Admiral *Byng*. Nay, permit me to aſſert, if the Admiral had not been induced to believe that the *French* Fleet could conſiſt only of Seven Ships, and this from Men who ought to have known the contrary, he never would have undertaken the Command without a proper Force; his principal Fault was believing them to ſpeak Truth, and his Force of Courſe ſufficient.

And though it has been aſſiduouſly reported by the Malevolence of evil-minded Men, that he requeſted the Command, they will not openly aſſert, he fought it any otherwiſe, than by the general Offer of his Service to his King and Country,

Country, which becomes the Duty of every Man of his Rank and Station in Times of War.

THUS then all Things appear to be well conducted to the Time of the *French* Fleet's appearing in View; when on seeing the Enemy, Considerations of another Nature took Place, and it became necessary to defer the Execution of all Resolutions which he had taken since he saw *Mahon*, and to recal the Men of War which he had dispatched to reconnoitre the Harbour, and procure Intelligence from General *Blakeney*. It was now to no Purpose to know the State of the Citadel and Harbour before he had engaged the *French* Fleet; he had no Soldiers to land but what made Part of the Complements of his Ships, and served as Marines; and if he had been provided with them, it would have been absolutely imprudent to have landed them before the Engagement with his Enemy, and thereby render that Force less, which was already too little for the Intent it ought to have been sent upon. Landing the Troops would have rendered the Fleet unfit for Action, and obliged it to flee before the Enemy. Had the Admiral behaved in that Manner, such a preposterous Act could not have failed rendering him justly delinquent, and unequal to the Command he presided in.

HE knew that if Success was the Consequence of engaging the *French*, that he should have it

more in his Power to relieve the Citadel, as far as landing the Troops, which ſerved as Marines, could effect it. But he ſuſpected alſo, and with Reaſon, that he might probably be rendered unable to keep the Seas, though he obtained the Victory, and therefore prevented from effectually ſuccouring the Citadel.

So far all appears to have been conducted with the greateſt Knowledge and Prudence, and the moſt partial Advocate for his Opponents can draw no reaſonable Objections to his Proceedings.

THIS Paſſage of his Letter, omitted in the *Gazette*, cannot well proceed from Clemency to the Admiral, nor from Tenderneſs of not irritating the Multitude more vehemently, by giving them all the Letter, as it hath been reported with ſuch Diligence.

I PRESUME it will rather appear this Tenderneſs began from other Motives, and nearer Home; ſince it ſeems too evidently to prove, that thoſe who planned the Expedition, prepared and appointed the Fleet, were beyond all Meaſure either ignorant or wicked.

THEIR Preciſeneſs in omitting an individual Word is no ſmall Argument of their Attention and Care; the miſerable Epithet *unfortunately*, in deſcribing the Loſs of the *Intrepid*'s Fore-Top-Maſt,

Top-Maſt, was omitted, leſt ſuch a palliating Expreſſion, imputing it to Chance, might alleviate the Odium, which ſeems by all poſſible Means deſigned to be thrown on the Admiral.

THE next Omiſſion is yet a greater Manifeſtation of the true Deſign of thoſe Gentlemen, who like Deer, beat *him* from the Herd which the Hounds begin to purſue. For after having caſtrated all that could prove his Prudence, and vindicate his Conduct before the Engagement, they now conceal what can moſt effectually juſtify his not engaging a ſecond Time, and not attempting to land a Reinforcement after the Battle.

WITH this View was not all that Part omitted, which mentions the Ships that were wounded in their Maſts, and endangered of not being ſecured at Sea, the great Sicklineſs of the Squadron, the Numbers killed and wounded, no Hoſpital-Ships ſent out to receive theſe unhappy brave Men, that a Forty Gun Ship converted to that Purpoſe would be unequal to the receiving one third of the Number, and which could not be well done at Sea; Circumſtances which entirely change the Face and Reaſon of Things, and throw the Blame which they intend for the Admiral, on the Planners of the Expedition and Appointers of the Fleet.

Now let the moſt ſtrenuous Advocate for the Ad——ty, the moſt prejudiced Purſuer of Mr *Byng*, tell you why this Paragraph was omitted, without confeſſing that this Omiſſion could not be made in his Favour. Will he ſay that Tenderneſs and Humanity diſtinguiſh this Action? Or will he not rather declare that the contrary is manifeſted beyond all Power of Denial.

It is evident from the Dates of the Time of Engagement, and of that of writing the Letter, that Four Days had paſſed in refitting the diſabled Ships, and yet that the Maſts of Three of them could not be ſecured fit for a ſecond Engagement; that if this could have been obtained, that the Ships Crews were too ſickly to undertake the Fatigue of a ſecond Combat, with not a Ship to put the ſick and wounded on board during an Action, which being left on board, muſt have diſheartened and interrupted thoſe who were able to perform their Duty.

The Neglect of not providing Hoſpital-Ships, as well as Fire-Ships, Store-Ships, and Tenders, could not proceed from any Fault, Inability, or Inattention in the Admiral. And if the Contempt of Money in the Perſon who muſt be imagined to have appointed this Fleet, was not ſo diſtinguiſhed, and did not forbid entertaining ſuch a Thought, would you not be inclined to think, that ſome ſiniſter Intent had determined him

him to prevent Succeſs in this Undertaking? Or that he deſigned the Fleet ſhould come too late to ſave *Minorca* and not engage; and therefore the Idea of providing Hoſpital-Ships, Fire-Ships, Store-Ships, and Tenders, Veſſels never omitted 'till now on ſuch Expeditions, never entered into his Imagination; for though I am willing to indulge this great Man, to prevent all Imputation of greater Crimes, with being the moſt ignorant of all Men who have ever ſat at that Board; yet I am afraid the Indulgence of the moſt conſummate Ignorance, will ſcarce preſerve him from the Taxation of ſomething more criminal, though not more fatal to your, your Sovereign's, and the Nation's Welfare.

BEFORE what Tribunal can Admiral *Byng* be juſtly condemned, for not ſeeking the Enemy in this diſabled Condition; not before that of the People of *England*, who, Lovers of ſtrict Juſtice in all Things, never decide contrary to her Dictates, when the whole of any Affair is impartially laid before them, nothing concealed, nor any Thing added, to diſguiſe the Truth.

LET me aſk his Accuſers, To what Purpoſe would this ſecond Engagement have been attempted, with a Fleet originally ſo greatly inferior to the *French*, and now rendered much more ſo by the Damages received in the late Battle? A total Defeat, in all Probability, is the Anſwer of Reaſon; and if Monſieur *La Galliſſonniere*

Galliſſonniere had fought it, which providentially he did not, it is a reaſonable Preſumption that the whole *Engliſh* Squadron would have periſhed, or fallen a Prey to the *French*, ſince there was no Port to ſhelter them. Whereas, had Mr *Byng* been in the *Mediterranean* before the Arrival of the *French* at *Minorca*, a Defeat on his Side even might have ſaved the Iſland; he could have then ſaved his ſhattered Remains in *Mahon*, and though conquered at Sea, by Means of the Sailors and Soldiers have preſerved *St Philip*'s, and probably the Iſland. Thus a Defeat of our Fleet, had it been timely ſent out, would have done more Service than a Victory after *St Philip*'s was inveſted.

THOSE who reaſon otherwiſe than in this Manner, exclude human Prudence from amongſt the Qualifications of a commanding Officer, a Talent of much more Uſe in the Day of Battle than tilting againſt Stone Walls, or engaging Yard-Arm and Yard-Arm againſt a ſuperior Force; and indeed I am more afraid that Mr *Byng*, after every Thing has been fairly urged in his Vindication, and maturely coſidered, will be found rather culpable in ſeeking the Enemy at firſt, than not ſeeking them after the Engagement.

IT has been the ſettled Rule of all great Generals, and of thoſe who have written beſt on the Subject of Armies, and the Manner of a General's

General's conducting them, as may be ſeen in moſt ancient Authors, and thoſe of more modern Date, particularly the Marquis *De Feuquiere*, and the Marquis *De Santa Cruz*, whoſe Words I ſhall quote, to conſider what Advantage can reſult from the Action before an Engagement be reſolved upon.

FIRST then let me quote the *Spaniard* on this Subject, which permit me to tranſlate.

" IF nothing is more uncertain than the Succeſs of a Battle, as I have juſt eſtabliſhed it to " be, this Conſequence is fairly drawn from it, " That no Commander ſhould ever riſque an Engagement, but when there is greater Expectations to gain by a Victory, than to loſe by a " Defeat."

AND *Feuquiere* on the ſame Subject, lays it down in this Manner as a Maxim not to be deviated from.

" I HAVE already ſaid in my Maxims on the " Subject of Battles, that a General never ought " to attack an Enemy, or to ſubject himſelf to " receive one from them, but when there is a " greater Advantage to be drawn to his Prince " by a Victory, than Diſadvantage to be feared " from a Defeat."

ACCORDING

ACCORDING to theſe Maxims of the moſt approved Writers on Military Affairs, Mr *Byng* ſeems not a little culpable, in firſt ſeeking the *French*, and juſtifiable only in declining the ſecond Engagement; that the Circumſtances in which he was placed before the Battle, correſpond exactly with the Directions and Maxims juſt laid down, is utterly undeniable; Firſt, becauſe it was romantic to expect that he could defeat the *French* Fleet againſt ſuch Superiority as has been already proved, it had over him; next, there was much to apprehend from a Defeat, and nothing to expect from a Victory, *St Philip*'s being already inveſted and irretrievably gone, with Reſpect to what Mr *Byng* could have aſſiſted in the Defence of it, when ſo great a Number of *French* Troops, with Artillery, Ammunition, Proviſions, and every Thing neceſſary were landed.

WHEN then, from the Inferiority of the *Engliſh*, nothing could be reaſonably expected but Misfortune and Diſgrace; or if by the greateſt Efforts of good Fortune, Victory ſhould declare for our Fleet, that no Advantage could be drawn from it; when the Riſque of loſing the whole Fleet was the Reſult of an unanimous Council of War; and the Nation, conſidering the real State of the *Engliſh* and *French* Navies, ſo little able to ſuſtain a Loſs of that Kind; when *Gibraltar* would have been left defence-

leſs,

leſs, and fallen of Courſe to the Enemy. Could the ſeeking the *French* Admiral, by a Commander who foreſaw theſe probable Conſequences, with not only an inferior, but a ſhattered Fleet, and no other Ships in the *Mediterranean* to reinforce him, have been juſtified in the Judgment of Men who have ſtudied the Nature of Military Atchievements, or according to the Rules and Obſervations of ancient and modern Writers on this Head?

The utmoſt Advantage could have been but a Prolongation of the Siege, without the leaſt Probability of raiſing it; becauſe the Fleet unable to keep the Seas muſt have retreated to *Gibraltar*, the Port of *Mahon* being ſtill commanded by the Enemies Batteries; from this View of Things it ſeems apparent, that the only wrong Step was leaving *Gibraltar* to give Battle to the *French*, and his Retreat to that Place the diſcreeteſt Act of Prudence and of a General, and in this Opinion the whole Council of War was unanimous: They did not imagine that a Commander in Chief with an inadequate Force was to engage at all Adventures, like *Moor* of *Moor-Hall*, who, with nothing at all, ſlew the Dragon of *Wantley*; indeed the Admiral was not a little ſurprized when he arrived at *Gibraltar* in going up to *Minorca*, and knew the Force of the Enemy, that Diſpatches had not come over-land to ſtop him 'till he received farther Reinforcement; Men of Senſe and Pru-

dence, who intended the Nation's Honour and Advantage, could not have omitted ſo neceſſary a Step; for though it is barely poſſible that they knew not the Strength of the *French* Fleet before it left *Toulon*, and the Admiral left *England*; they knew it well before he arrived at *Gibraltar*, and had ſufficient Time to have acquainted him of it, to ſtop his Proceeding to *Minorca*, to have reinforced the Fleet, and to have defeated the *French* before the Place was taken; this he thought neceſſary, and though his Orders would not permit him to tarry at *Gibraltar*, he could not avoid requeſting a Reinforcement with all Speed to protect that Place, as he foreſaw, that upon any Misfortune of great Conſequence to the Fleet which he commanded, this Fortreſs would be open to hourly Invaſions.

HAD the Prudence of thoſe who deſtine and prepare Fleets been equal to that of this Commander whom they ſeek to condemn, *Minorca* had been ſafe, the Honour of the Crown, and the Commerce of the Nation preſerved, and this Gentleman the Darling, whom they wiſh to be the Deteſtation of the People.

LET thoſe who omitted this Precaution anſwer you, why it was thus ignorantly or iniquitouſly omitted? can that be the Fault of Mr *Byng*; and when he expreſſes his Apprehenſions of being inferior to the Fleet under *La Galliſſonniere*,

niere, from the Intelligence he had received, what does it ariſe from, but a thorough Acquaintance with the Nature of his Profeſſion, rendering Juſtice to the Arms of one Nation as well as another, from a conſcious Deficiency in many Particulars, as well as in that of Weight of Metal, Number of Cannon and of Men, from a Suſpicion perhaps of ſome deluſive Proceedings in thoſe who had ſeduced him to Command ſo inferior a Fleet, by poſitively aſſerting, that the *French* could not conſiſt of more than *Seven Ships*, and would probably be but *Five*, as well as from ſome beginning Convictions, that it was not impoſſible, but that he, his brave Companions, the Honour and Intereſt of the King and Country, might be doomed a Sacrifice to fate the Appetite of ſome ſiniſter ruling Paſſion.

To me it appears inexplicable, as I doubt not it will to you, whence it can ariſe that a good Retreat of an inferior Force from before a ſuperior at Land, ſhould be conſidered as one of the moſt diſtinguiſhing, difficult, and meritorious Exploits of a General; and yet, that a Retreat equally well conducted at Sea under the ſame Circumſtances, ſhould be deemed a diſgraceful Action and worthy Puniſhment, more eſpecially as the whole Council of War, Land and Sea Officers, who muſt from their Situation and Profeſſions, naturally be the propereſt Judges of what was beſt to be done on ſuch Occaſions,

were unanimous, and thought *Gibraltar* in Danger.

Are Commanders then at all Events to ſhow no other Token of Generalſhip, but what is to be learned from Brutes? An Exceſs of Courage only? And are all who uſe the ſuperior Attributes of the human Underſtanding, to be conſidered as Delinquents in their Duty to their King and Country? What Commander of common Senſe will ſerve his Country under ſuch diſcouraging Conditions; where, unleſs he fights againſt all Kinds of Diſadvantage, he is to be ſtigmatiſed with the eternal Infamy of Cowardice; and if he does engage his Enemy, and does not ſucceed againſt this great Superiority of Force, he is to be deemed a Coward alſo, and given up to the Rage of the Multitude; his Letters publiſhed, and deprived of all that can vindicate him, with Additions intended to depreciate his prudent Endeavours, eſpecially when it is known, that all private Letters which can juſtify the Admiral have been ſuppreſſed, or made to ſpeak a different Senſe, by interlining, before they were produced; and all thoſe which revile and rail at his Behaviour, however abſurd, have been given to the Public.

Can the Deſign of omitting the Paragraph which I have been juſt examining, take it's Origin from Tenderneſs in expoſing the Admiral to the People's Contempt; whoever can

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give Credit to ſuch Aſſertions, can never be deemed an Infidel.

Does not this Behaviour proceed from a very contrary Motive; what is it but depriving him of his juſt Defence, and giving him to an enraged People, by injurious Miſrepreſentations, Falſhoods, and Concealments; is it not like lopping off a Man's Hands, and then bidding him to defend himſelf againſt his Adverſary? Is it not like cutting out a Man's Tongue, and then ordering him to plead in his own Defence? Is it not even inhuman? And ſince, to ſink the Truth, or to add a Falſhood, are equally conſidered as Perjury in the Law; why ſhould it be conceived otherwiſe in this Inſtance, and in thoſe Men, if this ſhall be proved to be the real State of the Caſe, eſpecially as the Event may prove equally fatal to the Perſon againſt whom theſe Things may be attempted.

The next Omiſſion begins with the Words, *of Minorca and Gibraltar*, which you will obſerve immediately follow the Word *Situation*; this Omiſſion determines the Reader to fix the Situation of the Fleet, as the Object on which the Admiral had gathered the Opinions of all the Officers; which real Condition of the Ships being concealed alſo, this Conſideration of it's Situation, made the Sentence ridiculous, as it too evidently ſeems deſigned it ſhould be: Whereas the Situations of *Minorca* and *Gibraltar* became

reaſonable

reaſonable Objects of their Conſideration ; it appeared impracticable to relieve *Mahon*, and probable that *Gibraltar* would be attacked, and therefore the Determination of proceeding thither, was become the moſt prudent Deciſion which could have been made, the moſt likely to conduce to the Nation's Service, and a juſt Reſolution of the Council of War.

As to the Victory, it ſignifies not much who claims it, but it was a Matter of Conſequence to conſider, that though two Fleets may be of equal Number, they may yet be of unequal Force, as we have already proved it happened in this Inſtance: and a ſickly Squadron, without Means of providing for the diſeaſed and wounded, or recruiting their Seamen and Soldiers, of which, more than a Thouſand Sick, which at their return to *Gibraltar*, were ſent to the Hoſpital, was a Conſideration that ought greatly to influence at that Moment, eſpecially when it was evident beyond all Contradiction, that the Enemy poſſeſſed every Advantage which the *Engliſh* Admiral was in want of, having a Power of procuring Recruits of Seamen from the Two Hundred Tranſports, and Soldiers from the Camp of the Beſiegers, and which every prudent Commander muſt have done, and was therefore highly reaſonable to be concluded, would be done, by the Admiral, Council of War, and by all who underſtand the Profeſſion of Arms.

DURING the four Days which Mr *Byng*'s Fleet was obliged to lye to to refit, *La Galliſſonniere*'s Fleet was ſeveral Times ſeen from their Maſt-head, as undoubtedly was that of Mr *Byng* by the *French* Admiral, a Circumſtance as well worth omitting, perhaps, as any of the whole, becauſe it is a dangerous Thing to permit a Queſtion, ſo liable to Conſtruction againſt any Mens Advantage, to come before the People of *England*, who, in ſearch of Truth, might not unlikely demand, why *La Galliſſonniere* with ſuch apparent Superiority did not attack the *Engliſh* Fleet once more, and then perhaps a ſatisfactory Anſwer might have been difficultly returned by thoſe who chuſe to conceal that Circumſtance: indeed this ſingle Circumſtance, in all Men who may be unacquainted with the upright Intentions of thoſe who planned the Expedition, may probably create a Suſpicion, that the *French* Admiral could not have conducted Matters in this abſurd Manner from Ignorance alone: nor the Planners of the Expedition have prepared a Fleet ſo unequal to what it ought to have been from that Cauſe: in what Manner, on the Principles of Reaſon and Knowledge in his Profeſſion, which he is allowed to poſſeſs, can it be accounted for, that *La Galliſſonniere* deſiſted from purſuing an Advantage which he had ſo apparently obtained, by diſabling five Ships of our Fleet, three of which could not be got fit for Service again without going into ſome Port.

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The next Day, and the three following, though he ſaw our Fleet, and might know it's Condition by a Cruiſer ſent for that Purpoſe, and probably did know it? why was the *French* Admiral ſo deficient in Duty to his King and Country, not to attempt deſtroying the *Engliſh* Fleet, by renewing the Combat on ſuch advantageous Terms, and complete the Victory which he had partly atchieved; was *La Galliſſonniere* a Coward too? Many are the Suggeſtions which are and may be formed on this Occaſion; I inſinuate none, but leave all Men to decide, for what Reaſon the *French* Admiral could be ſo complaiſant to the *Engliſh*, unleſs it was by Way of Return to thoſe of the Ad——y, who ſent out a Fleet ſo unable to diſturb him in covering the Siege of *St Philips*. One Thing I will aſſert, and produce my Reaſons for ſaying it if required, that Admiral *Byng* was intirely ignorant of any Conſideration which could have created this mutual Politeneſs, in the *Engliſh* Planners of the Expedition, of not diſturbing the Siege of *St Philips*; and of not deſtroying the *Engliſh* Squadron in thoſe of the *French*.

THINGS and Appearances being in this Situation, what could the moſt prudent and moſt couragious Man have done more than he performed? he relied on no Man's Word; Mr *Byng* proceeded immediately from *Gibraltar* to diſcover the Truth of Things; and having ſuffered from

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La Galliſſonniere's Squadron was diſabled from putting in Execution what he had intended before the Enemy's Fleet appeared in View.

After this laſt Omiſſion, a few Words of the Letter being left to remain, the Admiral proceeds with expreſſing his *Hopes* that he ſhould find Stores to refit the Fleet at *Gibraltar*, and a Reſolution of not loſing a Minute in ſeeking the Enemy again, *if he had any Reinforcement*, and once more giving them Battle.

You will eaſily diſcern the Reaſon of expreſſing himſelf by *Hopes* of finding Stores, if you recall, that in going up to *Minorca*, in his Letter from *Gibraltar*, he tells the Secretary of the Ad——y, that there were neither Stores nor Places in repair for refitting the Fleet. This Word was only uſed as a gentle Rebuke for this Neglect, and the moſt polite Hint, that if he ſhould tarry at *Gibraltar* longer than you, the People of *England*, unacquainted with the Cauſe, ſhould think requiſite, that ſome palliating Report for this Delay might be ſpread, to prevent Murmurs againſt him, who was only delinquent in Appearance, owing to the Neglect of thoſe whoſe Duty it is to provide Stores, and to keep careening Wharfs, Store-Houſes, and Pits, in due repair. How undeſervedly then was he calumniated? How induſtriouſly was the Slander of Delay ſpread by thoſe Men who were only culpable in this Part, from an

Expreſſion in his ſecond Letter from *Gibraltar*, publiſhed in the *Gazette*, " That watering was " tedious at that Place," omitting in this alſo the moſt favourable Circumſtances, as they did in the former.

At the ſame Time, his Reſolution of returning to give the Enemy Battle, could be no Argument of his Timidity; and when he adds, that the *French* had a great Advantage in being clean Ships, and *going three Feet* to one with his; What was there in this Expreſſion, ſo much carped at and ridiculed, but a Phraſe of all Seamen, who, to expreſs one Ship's ſailing much faſter than another, almoſt conſtantly uſe it? Was not the Reaſon for mentioning their ſailing faſter, then, prudent in all Reſpects? It was to guard againſt any unwarrantable Expectations, which Men, unacquainted with naval Affairs, might entertain from a Reinforcement; becauſe, though one Fleet is vaſtly ſuperior to another, yet the inferior Fleet being better ſailers, may eaſily eſcape by running before the Wind, if the ſuperior Squadron has the Wind of them; and by turning to Windward, if they have the Wind of the ſuperior Force. And though the Admiral aſſigns no other Reaſon for this ſailing better than the *Engliſh*, but their being *clean* Ships, he might have juſtly added their being *better* Ships alſo; which reflects not a little on the Superviſors of naval Affairs, who have been inattentive to Improvements

ments at home, and only ſlowly copied the *French* in their Manner of building.

Besides this, Mr *Byng* concluded, from the Behaviour of Monſieur *La Galliſſonniere*, that he would neglect no Way of conducting his Fleet with Judgment, and conſequently chuſe, from this Advantage of better ſailing, in what Manner the Combat ſhould be carried on; and which, by preventing the coming to a cloſe Engagement, with a View of diſabling the *Engliſh* Ships, he had already too ſucceſsfully put in Execution.

This Part then became abſolutely neceſſary to be omitted, againſt a Man determined to be overwhelmed, becauſe it takes the Fault of tarrying at *Gibraltar* from him, and places it on their Neglect of that Place. It ſhows, by his Reſolution of engaging again, that he could not be juſtly taxed with Cowardice; it proves his Knowledge of what is to be expected from a ſuperior Fleet, which is out-ſailed by an inferior; and his Politeneſs, in not mentioning with Acrimony the Neglect of ſending a Reinforcement ſooner, and of keeping *Gibraltar* in Repair: Examine one Minute in how different a Manner his and your Enemies have obſerved a reciprocal Behaviour towards him and you.

As to the *Three Feet to One*, it meant no more than that the *French* ſailed faſter than the

Engliſh; which, if they had ſailed only as Thirteen to Twelve, would as effectually have anſwered all their Purpoſes, and all that the Admiral intended to be conveyed by the Expreſſion, *ſailing faſter than his Fleet.*

WHAT Truth is there then in the prevailing Report given out by his Accuſers, that Tenderneſs for his Character, and not deſigning to aggravate his Faults, were the true Cauſe of omitting theſe Paſſages in the *Gazette.*

ARE not theſe Particulars ſo many Juſtifications of Mr *Byng*'s not renewing the Engagement againſt a Fleet, which had already diſabled him, and which had the Power of chuſing their Manner of fighting? Ought not theſe Conſiderations alone, without inferring the Conſequence of ill Succeſs, to have determined him againſt engaging the Enemy once more, and riſquing a total Defeat.

THE next Paragraph which is omitted, is the urging the Ad——y to a ſpeedy Reinforcement, if none was already ſent, a Requeſt which he had before made; at the ſame Time acquainting them with the increaſing Strength of the Enemy at *Toulon*, by four large Ships; which Circumſtance, though it tends not to juſtify the Admiral's Behaviour, gives a favourable Idea of his Zeal for Succeſs, and a contemptible one of thoſe, who, preſiding at the Head of Affairs, had

had been totally ignorant of what was preparing at *Toulon*, and negligent *at beſt* of what happened to *Minorca:* unleſs you may poſſibly by this Time be apprehenſive, that ſome other Motives conduced to this Behaviour in them.

THE laſt Paragraph has but one Word omitted, which, inſtead of "making the beſt of my "Way to *Gibraltar*," is to *cover Gibraltar*; a very material Alteration; the going to *cover* a Place being very different from going *to* a Place, the one ſignifying an Act of Prudence, and of a Soldier; the other, in ſuch Inſtances, of Flight, and of a Fugitive. Was not this Monoſyllable premeditately left out, to prevent you from aſking what Danger *Gibraltar* was in, and to what Part of the Letter this referred? Does it not ſeem to be the preſent Employment of the *Gazette* to miſrepreſent, and of the Writers or Directors of it, to keep the People of *England* as ignorant as poſſible of the real Situation of any Place, which may be deſigned to be given up to your declared Enemies, by thoſe who are your concealed, if Men can be denominated concealed, who are thus open in purſuing a Nation's Ruin?

EVERY Man amongſt you, who can diſtinguiſh Right from Wrong, will, I doubt not, behold this perfidious Action of omitting the Parts of a Letter, which can moſt effectually plead the Juſtification of the Writer, with all due

due Abhorrence; notwithſtanding which criminal Proceeding, permit me to ſay, there remains ſomething which is yet a ſtronger Indication of more blameable Deſign in thoſe who have been guilty of the former Miſbehaviour; to omit with Deſign to injure, is ſurely a criminal Proceeding; and to add, with Deſign to create a farther Accuſation of Offence, muſt be yet a more heinous Crime in the Eyes of all Men of Probity.

In Continuation of this Intent to accumulate the Guilt of Mr *Byng*, is it not extremely probable, that the Liſts of the Two Fleets were printed at the End of his Letter in the *Gazette*, taking perhaps the Hint of that Deſign, from Part of the Poſtſcript, in which he ſays, "I "have juſt ſent the Defects of the Ships, as I "have got it made out whilſt I was cloſing my "Letter." Then adding what the Admiral never ſent, and concealing what he did. The Defects of the Ships are very conſiderable, as hath been already ſaid, five of them receiving much Damage; three of which could not, in the Opinion of the beſt Judges, be repaired at Sea for a ſecond Action; the Liſt of this Damage may be hereafter printed. At the ſame Time, under Favour of the above Sentence, Occaſion was taken to add the Liſts of the Ships, a ſpurious one, even with Reſpect to our Fleet; which methinks thoſe who inſerted it ought to be better acquainted with, whatever it might be

be their Duty to know of the *French*; leaving out the Weight of Metal and Number of Hands on board, and putting in the Number of killed and wounded, that is, preſerving all, in which a ſeeming Equality conſiſted, and caſtrating all, in which the *French* were eminently ſuperior. Nor was this the only Variation from Truth, for ſome conſiderable Addition was made to the Number of the *Engliſh* Cannon, and a Dimunition of the *French*, with a View probably to bring the two Numbers nearer each other, and to creatte the Idea of Equality in the two Squadrons. I hope it is no uncharitable Suggeſtion to ſay, That this ſpurious and partial Liſt of each Fleet, was inſerted to aggravate your Reſentment againſt the Admiral, and to gain a Belief, that the Defects of the Ships which accompanied this Letter, was no more than a Liſt of the killed and wounded, an Artifice ſavouring of much deſpicable Cunning, ſeen through by every Man who had Senſe enough to reflect, that though Mr *Byng* had ſent the Number of his own killed and wounded, he could not well come at that of Monſieur *La Galliſſonniere*. Can theſe Liſts have been added with an honeſt Intent? Was it not deſigned to create the Idea of his being a Coward? And to ſtrengthen, by this Addition, what they had begun to inſinuate by the former Omiſſions.

Let me now appeal to the Hearts of Men conſpicuous for the Love of Juſtice and Humanity

nity amongſt all Nations; is it not perfidious Treatment, not only to cut out the genuine Juſtification of a Man's own Words, but as it were to ſuborn falſe Evidence, and add it to the Account which was tranſmitted by the Admiral, with a View of depreciating him in the Eyes of his Fellow-Subjects, and letting looſe the popular Clamour againſt him.

INDEED when we review theſe Artifices, and reconſider the Reports which were ſpread among the People during the Preparations at *Toulon*, after their arriving at *Minorca*, whilſt our Fleet was preparing, and after it's Departure, will there not ariſe certain Suſpicions which Prudence would rather conceal than hint at, in any Caſe but that of preſerving one's Country from future Misfortunes of a ſimilar Nature, and preſerving the Life of a Fellow-Subject? We ſhall endeavour to recollect ſome of them, and let thoſe who chuſe to examine them, draw that Concluſion which ſeems the moſt probable.

FIRST, then, how came the *French* to form the Idea of taking *St Philips*, when the Fleet of *England*, known to be ſo ſuperior, might have prevented the Embarkation; if not that, their Deſcent on *Minorca*; if that could not have been done, reinforced *St Philips*, beat the *French* Fleet, and taken the whole Embarkation Priſoners. Is the Duke of *Richlieu* ſo Military mad, that he would have undertaken

to

to command in an Expedition which had been preparing for five Months, known to all *Europe*, and open to be disconcerted in all the above different Manners? Would not this have rather proved him fitter for *Bedlam*, than a Command in Chief? Is not this repugnant to what *Feuquiere* and *Santa Cruz* have positively enjoined? And if the Duke would have been hardy enough to undertake it, would the *French* Ministry have permitted him? Would the Directors of our Marine Preparations, had they been in earnest to preserve *St Philips*, have sent out an inferior Squadron? Delayed it at *Spithead* during so many Months? And given the Admiral absolute Orders to expedite other Services, by not taking Men from particular Ships, nor from any Ship fit for Service, to man his own Squadron, but to wait the coming of Tenders with pressed Men from *Liverpole* and other Ports? And before the Arrival of more than two, he was obliged to sail.

HAD the Planners of the Expedition been truly animated with the Interest of their Country, why, during this Preparation at *Toulon*, when all *England*, and all *Europe*, was exclaiming against their Delay, did they continually give out to you, that there was no Fleet preparing at *Toulon?* That the *French* had no Sailors nor military Stores; was not this to be the palliating Speech to the People to countenance their Proceedings? Was it not to give the *Air of* relieving

St Philips only that the *Engliſh* Fleet ſet ſail a few Days before the *French*, and before a certain Intelligence of it was given to the Public? Though the Day for leaving *Toulon* by the latter muſt, beyond all Doubt, be known by thoſe who prevented it's Relief, in ſending a Fleet from hence ſo inferior to the Undertaking.

When the popular Clamour now began to be very loud againſt this ſhameful Behaviour, were not ten thouſand Stories invented to draw off the public Attention from the Planners of the Expedition, and to throw it on him who commanded, and who they concluded would miſcarry? Was it not owing to a Deſign of ill Succeſs in them that the Fleet was ſent out ſo ſmall, and that he was aſſured the *French* Armament could not poſſibly exceed ſeven Ships, and probably would not be more than five? Was it not conſtantly aſſerted, that no Fleet was ever ſo well manned, equipped, and powerful, for the Number, as this *Engliſh* Fleet? And that the *French* conſiſted of old Ships not fit for Service, ill-manned, and worſe provided; whereas one Moment's Thought would have told them, that a Fleet, however ill-furniſhed with Men, when it left *Toulon*, muſt be abundantly provided with Hands from Two Hundred Tranſports, which after landing the Troops and Ammunition, and at Anchor, could very well ſpare two thirds of their Crews; as to the Ships being feeble or ill-fitted out, the

Falſhood

Falſhood of that Aſſertion is now perfectly well known. Was not this Story, of great Deficiency in the *French* Fleet, propagated to create a Belief in you, that *La Galliſſonniere* was inferior to Mr *Byng*; as the extolling the Strength of our Fleet, was to make the latter appear ſuperior? To thoſe ſpurious Accounts of the different Strength of the two Fleets, was it not conſtantly added, that Mr *Byng* could blow the *French* out of the Water? With what Intent could this be propagated, but to aggravate the Miſcarriage of the Admiral, by creating an Opinion of his ſuperior Force, and to animate your Expectations with Views of Succeſs, the more effectually to inflame your Reſentment againſt him, when the the ill News of his not prevailing ſhould arrive, and which they muſt foreſee?

The Citadel of *Mahon* being attacked, it now became the common Converſation amongſt the Planners of the Voyage, that the Fortification could not hold out a Week, with a Deſign to leſſen the Surprize of it's being taken; or if it was defended any conſiderable Time, to give an Idea of it's being well provided; does it not therefore ſeem evident, from the Fleet of *England* being appointed ſo inferior, ſo long delayed after it was ready, ſent ſo late, without a Soldier but thoſe who acted as Marines, without an Hoſpital-Ship, Fireſhip, Tranſports, or Tenders; that no Battle was intended to be fought, nor *St Philips* relieved? But by this

delay, to give Time to Marſhal *Richlieu* to take the Fortification, return with his Fleet, and leave Mr *Byng* to cruiſe ineffectually round *Minorca*; indeed the brave *Iriſhmen* diſappointed the Expectations of thoſe who had thus deſigned the whole Tranſaction, by defending the Place becoming the Duty of *Britiſh* Subjects, and not according to ſiniſter Intention.

By this contemptible Cunning, a Quality often connected with Ignorance in little Minds, it ſeems contrived, that if General *Blakeney* gave up the Citadel before Mr *Byng*'s Arrival, then *he* was to be exclaimed againſt, and charged with Cowardice; and if he held out, as the Admiral was inſufficient, then that Imputation was to fall on the latter.

Was it not therefore owing to the daily Diſappointment of hearing that the Citadel had ſurrendered, that no Fleet was ſent to reinforce Mr *Byng*; apprehending, that with a Reinforcement he would raiſe the Siege, which ſeems ſo contrary to the Intent of ſending him? Was it not on this Account that they did not ſtop him by Expreſs at *Gibraltar*, to wait for more Ships of War? And at laſt, was not the Reinforcement ſent when it could not poſſibly arrive 'till after the Admiral had ſucceeded or miſcarried.

At length comes a Letter from Monſieur *La Galliſſonniere*, of the *Engliſh* Fleet having retired before the *French*, when immediately a Report prevailed, that from a Letter ſent by Admiral *Byng* from *Gibraltar*, it was foreſeen that he would not fight; with what Intent was this added, but to confirm your Sentiments in his being a Coward, according to the Reſolution which had been taken of throwing the whole Blame of the Miſcarriage on him, before his own Account could come to ſet Matters right in the People's Opinion. After ſome Time a Letter from Admiral *Byng* arrives, printed in the *Gazette*, where the moſt material Paſſages in Vindication of his Conduct are cut out; why were theſe omitted, but to preſerve the former Impreſſions of his having behaved like a Coward, at the ſame Time condemning the Reſolutions of the whole Council of War unheard, a moſt flagrant Affront on Men of ſuperior Birth, by one who has undeſervedly ſtarted into Nobility.

It was now neceſſary to continue inventing more Tales to ſupport your Reſentment againſt Mr *Byng*; one Day it was given out, that he had ſold out of the Stocks, forty-four thouſand Pounds before he ſailed, which was to inſinuate, that he left *England* with a Deſign never to return; The Falſhood of this Report may be ſeen in the Stock Books. Then it was reported, that this

was

was the Man who cruiſed before *Genoa* laſt War, and took Money to let Veſſels with Proviſions and Men paſs to the Relief of the Town; a known Falſhood, and were not the Aſhes of the Dead ſacred, I would tell you his Name: Was not this to hint the Idea of Venality?

THEN it ſeems it was diſcovered, that a Ship with Proviſions had gotten into *Mahon* the very Day before the Action, which Ship arrived at the Port a Month before the inveſting the Citadel; was not this to inſinuate that he might have landed his Soldiers alſo?

THESE Rumours being grown a little cool, Ballads were made to keep up your Reſentment, and the Admiral hanged and burnt in Effigy at the national Expence, by the Clerks and Officers of Public Offices, amongſt whom one Mr *Glover*, belonging to the *Victualling-Office*, burning him in *White-Chapel* Road, was rewarded with a broken Leg by the *Barking* Stage-Coach.

IT was now thought neceſſary to aſſert, that Mr *Byng* was attempting to eſcape in Women's Cloaths, to impart the Idea of conſcious Guiltineſs, which is likewiſe an Invention of Falſhood; and yet this Idea was to be continued by fixing Iron Bars to the Windows, to prevent a Man from eſcaping, whom they wiſh to be well rid of,

and

and who would not leave the Place if they would permit him.

At one Time he is repreſented as mad, and then as killing himſelf with drinking: then, that it is to be feared he may attempt Suicide. Believe me, he has not loſt his Senſes, as his Accuſers will find, nor will he deſtroy himſelf with *his own Hands*; and it is your Duty to preſerve his Life, for the Sake of more perfectly knowing what influenced his Purſuers to contrive and conduct the Expedition in ſo prepoſterous a Manner. Then the Author of the *Evening Advertiſer* is engaged to keep alive the Idea of Mr *Byng*'s being a Coward; a proper Employment for a Man who has riſen to Dignities by the infamous Practice of an Informer.

And laſtly, theſe contemptible Artifices are followed by a Letter to Ad——l *B—g*, publiſhed at the Expence of his and your Enemies, and hawked through the Streets for the Sake of univerſal Publication. This ſingle Circumſtance, in the Minds of all Men of Senſe, ſo inhumanly contrived to keep up the popular Prejudice *againſt* the Admiral and *from* themſelves, amounts to an Acknowledgment of *their* Guilt and of *his* Innocence; otherwiſe, ſome one Proof of what is there charged would certainly have been brought againſt him. But the whole is an entire Declamation, intended to inflame your Minds, founded on no one *Argument*, and concludes

cludes with a *Confeſſion*, which his Adverſaries would do extremely well to learn by Heart, againſt that Day when public *Juſtice* will demand them to their *Tryals*.

DOES not this Uniformity of Behaviour, in planning the whole Affair, prove, that Mr *Byng* was not the great culpable Perſon? There muſt be ſome other Source of his and your Misfortunes; otherwiſe the *French* muſt have been Madmen or Fools to have attacked *Minorca* in that Manner, and ſome of this Nation Madmen or Fools to attempt preſerving it with ſo unequal a Force.

AFTER all, Are not ſuch deſpicable Proceedings in Men of Rank, below the Behaviour of the meaneſt Beggar? What an Inſult on your Underſtandings, to conceive the abſurd Idea of ſcreening themſelves from your Enquiry, and ſeeking Preſervation, by drawing, hanging, and burning, a Man in Effigy, who, however culpable in this Action, muſt be white as Snow compared with them, whoſe Sins are red as Scarlet.

FROM what Origin can ſuch Proceedings ſpring, but from conſcious Delinquency and Apprehenſion of Danger? had they believed themſelves innocent, why did they conceal thoſe material Paſſages in his Letter, and add a ſpurious and malicious Liſt of the Two Fleets? Was it not with Deſign to depreciate the Commander's

Plea,

Plea, as much as poſſible, before his Fellow-Subjects? Had they been conſcious of performing their Duty, why was he not left to the true Recital of his Conduct? His Miſbehaviour could not have affected them; the World would have been ſatisfied with a true Narration of the Circumſtances; *they* had *been cleared, and Mr* Byng *ſtood unprejudiced, by injurious Calumnies in your Opinion*; juſtly condemned if delinquent, or juſtly diſcharged if innocent. Was it not their internal Guilt which prohibited them from behaving with Integrity, and I preſume by this Time, as in Caſes of Murder, too great Deſire to conceal the Crime, has ſhewn you who were the Capital Offenders.

It becomes now the eſſential Duty of every *Engliſhman*, to diveſt himſelf of all thoſe Prejudices which have been ſo artfully propagated againſt Mr *Byng*, to reſent, with becoming Spirit, the inſulting Deſign of duping you, by Miſrepreſentation of the Truth, to become Accomplices in purſuing, even to Death, a Man who muſt be unjuſtly treated, becauſe hitherto his Story has never been known, and his Juſtification concealed.

Heaven forbid that the Integrity of *Engliſhmen* ſhould be deceived by the Wiles of Men, who do not poſſeſs one Praiſe-worthy Qualification; or their Judgments perverted by crafty Repreſentations, to become Auxiliaries in com-

pleting the Ruin of him *they* intend to deſtroy. I know you have hitherto determined equitably according to what has been laid before you; I blame not the Deciſion, becauſe it flows from the Love of Juſtice and your Country. All I requeſt is, that you would now conſider the Caſe of Mr *Byng* with the ſame Zeal which his Adverſaries are purſuing him; receive the Truth as you did the Deluſion; reſent the Impoſition, and ſee Juſtice done to him whom they wiſh to ruin. Without your Approbation they will not dare to make him ſuffer unjuſtly, and with it I tremble for him, however innocent he may be. Conſider the Situation of that Man, whoſe Death may be neceſſary to preſerve the Lives of others. Conſider what the Diſpoſitions of Men, who have almoſt undone the Nation, muſt be againſt a Fellow-Subject, whom it may be convenient to deſtroy. If he ſuffer, you will repent too late the not having liſtened to the Admonitions of theſe Sheets. Let your Prejudices be abated, for the Sake of Equity to him and to yourſelves; it is become an indiſpenſible Act of Juſtice to ſupport him, who has been injured, againſt Men who by every Art have inſinuated his being guilty. By his Death you may ſave the Deſtroyers of your Country. Urge then that the greateſt Criminals be firſt brought to Juſtice, and that ſuch exiſt, can need no farther or more convincing Proof, than the Inſufficiency of the *Engliſh* Fleet, the long Delay in ſending it, the Want of Stores

and

and Artificers at *Gibraltar*, the ordering the Marines out of Mr *Byng*'s Squadron at *Portſmouth*, ſending no Troops to *Mahon*, no Hoſpital-Ships, Fire-Ships, or Tenders, the ſending him with foul and crazy Ships, ill manned and old, the Concealment of his Vindication, and adding to his Deſtruction by Ten Thouſand calumniating Inventions.

ARE not theſe the ſtrongeſt Proofs of Delinquency? Do they not amount to almoſt a Demonſtration, that the Blame lies not greatly againſt Mr *Byng*, and that what has happened, has not been repugnant to the Inclinations of his Purſuers? Did they ever deſign that *Minorca* ſhould find Relief from the Fleets and Armies of *Great-Britain?*

NOTWITHSTANDING this favourable Appearance on his Side, and criminal on theirs, I aſk not Mercy, but Juſtice to Mr *Byng*, his Purſuers, and your Country; all I requeſt is a candid Tribunal, an impartial Enquiry, and an unprejudiced People, which I wiſh alſo to thoſe who have thus inhumanly treated him. If they have all erred alike, give them up to the ſame condign Puniſhment. If their Guilt is unequal, you will not add Cruelty to Injuſtice, but let their Puniſhments be proportioned to it. If he is proved guiltleſs, you will preſerve him. But at all Events remember, that thoſe, in whoſe Hearts the horrid Compound of Cunning and Iniquity

Iniquity reſide, who have brought this once flouriſhing Country to ſo ruinous a State, eſcape not, by the Sufferings of Mr *Byng*, the Rewards which are due to them. To you I appeal; be *Engliſhmen*, and I fear no Injuſtice to him who is thus unjuſtifiably purſued; him whom you have already been deceived to condemn, you will now be reſolved to ſee treated according to the Laws, Rights, and Privileges, of a Fellow-Subject and free *Briton*.

F I N I S.

ERRATA.

Page 1. line 1. for *of* r. *on*.
P. 9. l. 29. for *his* r. *this*.
P. 14. l. 15. for *their* r. *our*.
P. 32. l. 2. for *remain* r. *remains*.
P. 51. l. 32. for *he* r. *be*.

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